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The phenomena of friendship and giftship in antiquity have been the focus of much 
anthropological interest, yet those terms are still used much too broadly, wherein any one can 
be friends and anything exchanged is a gift. This article argued that proper friendship requires 
equality of exchange and status. When inequality of exchange is present, we will almost 
always also have inequality of status. These two things together naturally and necessarily 
result in the absence of frank speech. At this point, proper friendship (defined by frank speech) 
and the exchange of gifts (defined by equality of value) are impossible, and we have fictive-
friendship, a term I have introduced in this article. Fictive-friendship refers to the practice, 
often but not exclusively amongst elites, of using friendship language to mask relationships of 
dependence (patronage and clientage). I closed my argument by looking at two examples of 
fictive-friendship in the Gospel of John.
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Introduction
There exists in scholarship on antiquity – including New Testament scholarship – a good deal of 
imprecision in the use of the terminology of gifting. Typically, ‘gift’ is a catch-all term that covers 
things exchanged between family members, between an emperor and his governors and senators, 
his cities and their people, between a rich large-holder and his dependents, and between a master 
and a slave. Gifts, in other words, transcend social status and perhaps even erase it, a notion that 
surely serves as the foundation for the correlation of giftship with friendship.
It is arguable that this imprecision can be traced back to Marcel Mauss’s highly influential work on 
the gift (Mauss 1990). Mauss developed what he, and others after him, believed to be a universal 
cross-cultural model of gift exchange from data drawn from the Melanesian and Andaman 
Islands, North-West Coast aboriginal and also, though to a lesser extent, from ancient Roman, 
Hindu and Germanic legal or literary texts. For Mauss, a gift was a something positive: it was 
traditional, old fashioned in the best sense, moral, healthy, mutually and universally beneficial, 
pleasant, personally binding and, above all, socially constructive. Mauss draws a very strong 
connection between giftship and friendship, which is also important for our purposes here. 
Throughout his work, Mauss stresses the close social relationships that derive from exchange, 
even in agonistic encounters such as the potlatch. For Mauss, to refuse a gift ‘is tantamount to 
declaring war; it is to reject the bond of alliance and commonality’ (Mauss 1990:17). In other 
words, it is a refusal of friendship, for gift exchange ignores status difference. Mauss’s correlation 
of giftship and friendship is nowhere more strongly articulated than in Marshall Sahlins’s 
comment summarising Mauss’s work, that ‘If friends make gifts, gifts make friends’ (Sahlins 
1972:186). For Mauss, as well as for the litany of scholars he influenced, gifts are both the raw 
materials that create civilised societies and the bond that keeps them from disintegrating.
Mauss’s imprecise representation of giftship as a form of exchange and his correlation of it 
to friendship still persists. One example in which this is particularly evident is Paul Veyne’s 
extremely influential and well-received work, Bread and circuses (1990):
Every class of the population benefitted from gifts. The poor received them as charity, or in the capacity 
of clients, or in that of free citizens. The slaves received them as a result of philanthropy or paternalism. 
The peasants, sharecroppers on the states of the rich, were forgiven their arrears of dues ... so long as they 
did not leave their master, this being, for landowners, a way of keeping tenants dependent upon them. 
Advocates, so long as their occupation was not recognized as a profession and they were forbidden to 
demand payment, received gifts from their clients as honorariums ... Corporations also received gifts. 
From the beginning of the Imperial period, making gifts to the Roman state was a privilege reserved of the 
Emperor alone. But the cities and municipalities of the Empire received gifts from the state nobility (the 
senatorial order), the regional nobility (the equestrian order), the notables who made up the municipal 
nobility (the order of decurians) and the rich freedmen ... The provinces of the Empire likewise received 
gifts, in a particular way. 
(Veyne 1990:5 –6)
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Clearly for Veyne, a ‘gift’ is anything that passes from one 
entity to another, regardless of other concerns, such as the 
relative status of the two parties, the relationship between 
them and the ability of one to repay the other. In very telling 
language, Veyne comments that the Hellenistic world looked 
‘like a society of “friends” and citizens’ (Veyne 1990:8). 
Veyne (1990) draws one interesting example of a gift from 
Polybius (Histories 4.65): Attalus of Pergamum fortified a 
fortress of the Aetolians and later the Aetolians supported 
Attalus in resisting Philip of Macedon. Veyne thus 
understands the purpose of Attalus’s benefaction to have 
been the maintenance of useful political alliances. But he 
does not mention that this is also patron-client behaviour. 
The issue here is of primary cause versus secondary result: 
was the maintenance of useful political relations the cause 
or the result of the benefaction? In Veyne’s very functionalist 
and irenic perspective (like that of Mauss), it can only be 
the latter. But to receive a benefaction is to be obligated to 
someone.
To anticipate evidence we shall encounter below, it was 
common knowledge that some people and states did not wish 
to be under an obligation, to be dependent or subordinate 
to others. That Veyne does not see this is surprising, when 
he notes that ‘the Achaeans were unwilling to accept gifts 
from certain kings’ (Veyne 1990:103). Of course they were; 
if accepting gifts put one in a position of being a client and 
having to follow certain customs of honour and obligation 
towards a patron nation or king, then it is fully understandable 
that some would be wary of entering into such a relationship.
At the greatest level of abstraction, there is no problem with 
using categories such as friendship and giftship expansively 
and letting them apply across as broad a range of exchanges 
and relationships as possible. The problem, as illustrated 
in Veyne’s observations, is when we become interested in 
the actual social relationships and social dynamics between 
exchanging parties, not just in the general tenor of exchange, 
as was Mauss’s interest. This is the point at which precision 
becomes desirable and because the Fourth Gospel is our 
exegetical focus, it is precision in an ancient Graeco-Roman 
setting that is needed. The driving questions in what follows 
are twofold: ‘When is a gift not really a gift?’ and ‘Who can 
be friends?’
Mapping exchange
One way to limit confusion is to treat the term ‘gift’ not as 
a general catch-all term, not as a category at the same level 
of abstraction as exchange, but rather to acknowledge that 
exchange is itself the broad category and that gifting is one 
specific type of exchange. This can be achieved by placing 
giftship accurately within the spectrum of exchange or 
reciprocity, which, of course, will be different for every 
culture and sometimes for subcultures too. It seems to me 
that this is rarely done in discussions of gifting.
Sahlins (as influenced by Mauss) was one of the first to aspire 
to map exchange more accurately by introducing three types 
of exchange: ‘Generalised’, ‘Balanced’ and ‘Negative’. The 
first is situated within the larger kinship unit, is selfless, open 
ended and can withstand a long period before reciprocation 
happens. Sahlins (1972) offered as examples a mother’s 
breastfeeding and food sharing amongst family members. 
The second type of exchange, ‘Balanced reciprocity’, moves 
us further from the kinship centre and thus is more prone 
to self-interest. As the name suggests, this type of exchange 
requires balance in what is exchanged and thus includes gift 
exchange, trades, buying and selling, and marriage contracts. 
Negative reciprocity moves us ever further from the kinship 
centre and is the least intimate or positive of the three types. 
Negative reciprocity threatens social stability because it 
tries to get something for nothing. Sahlins (1972) counted 
bartering, stealing and raiding in this group. Two features are 
useful in this typology: one is the recognition that exchanges 
that occur within kinship units are different from other types 
of exchange, for instance, that breastfeeding is not a gift one 
makes to one’s child and, secondly, that gift exchange is a 
balanced form of exchange. 
Nonetheless, the cross-cultural applicability of Sahlins’s 
model is limited by two things. Firstly, the societies that were 
his focus were fairly egalitarian, in that they appear to have 
had little awareness of status difference.1 Secondly, Sahlins’s 
model of exchange measures all forms of exchange based 
on their social distance from the kinship centre: the purest 
form of exchange is that between mother and child, because 
it is selfless, and exchange becomes increasingly selfish (and 
negative) from there. This might be fair for a society in which 
the principle social institution is kinship, but that does not 
describe Graeco-Roman society and thus some modifications 
have been made in order to fit the model better to Graeco-
Roman society.2 
This can be accomplished by recognising that in the Graeco-
Roman world, kinship is not the central, binding institution 
that it is in the societies on which Mauss and Sahlins focused. 
In a society where kinship is central, everything is measured 
according to its proximity to the family, or social distance, 
as we saw with Sahlins’s types of reciprocity. In the hyper-
status-conscious Graeco-Roman world, on the other hand, 
status distance replaces social distance. Yet, it is not at all the 
case that kinship is unimportant in Graeco-Roman cultures. 
This caveat cannot be overemphasised. It is not that kinship 
is absent from social concerns in the Graeco-Roman world, 
but rather that status is not derived singularly from it 
(as it is in the societies Mauss and Sahlins studied). In the 
Graeco-Roman world, status was derived from multivalent 
considerations that included (in no particular order) gender, 
education, ethnicity, wealth, power, and freedom (or its 
lack), in addition to kinship.3
1.As was the practice of the day, Mauss and Sahlins refer to the societies on which 
they focus as ‘primitive’ or archaic, defined by Sahlins as those ‘lacking a political 
state’ (Sahlins 1972:188). Aside from concerns over the problematic terminology, I 
have found that describing the societies is more helpful than labelling them.
2.T.F. Carney also felt that Sahlins’s simpler categories would have to be adapted to fit 
the more complex Graeco-Roman society (Carney 1973:64).
3.Having said this, it is possible that my observations on the demotion of kinship in 
the Graeco-Roman world might apply more to urban than rural settings, but even if 
kinship is more closely tied to status in rural settings, it still will not have been the 
sole factor.
Page 2 of 7
Original Research
http://www.hts.org.za doi:10.4102/hts.v67i3.997
Page 3 of 7
The Graeco-Roman model of exchange
For the Graeco-Roman world, a model of exchange based 
on status distance works better than one based on social 
distance.4 This model would look as follows.
Familial exchange
Broadly defined, this is the form of exchange that occurs 
within the family. It recognises, as Sahlins did, that familial 
exchange is different from extra-familial exchange and 
therefore needs to be set apart. 
Symmetrical exchange
Symmetrical exchanges are those in which there is symmetry 
of status (of those doing the exchanging) and symmetry of 
value (of what is being exchanged). When the value of what 
is exchanged ceases to be symmetrical or balanced, the 
relationship breaks down. Hence, we find here, amongst 
other things, gift exchange, but also market exchange, a 
dynamic that requires some explanation. 
It is not the case that gift and market exchange are 
indistinguishable, but simply that they are both to some 
extent symmetrical. In market exchange, it may not be 
that the relative status of buyer and seller are technically 
symmetrical, but rather that the relative status of the two 
does not (or should not) affect the transaction. When status 
intervenes in market exchange, then clearly the laws of market 
exchange have been usurped. There is definite symmetry in 
the market exchange itself, because the seller (with the help 
perhaps of market conditions) has decided on the value of 
a good and the buyer pays it. But consider the following 
hypothetical scenario: an elite leader enters a shop and the 
shop owner gives the elite everything for free. Clearly, the 
relationship has now become one of patronage and clientage. 
So the very point at which status intervenes in market 
exchange is the point at which market exchange ceases to be 
symmetrical. Thus, market exchange is symmetrical on value 
and somewhat symmetrical on status. The exchange of gifts 
conversely refers to exchanges between status equals with 
the ability to reciprocate with something equally valuable 
(value equality). 
Asymmetrical exchange
Asymmetrical exchanges are those that occur between parties 
of unequal status involving exchanges of unequal value. 
Reciprocation is not made in kind, for if it were, it would 
become gift exchange (e.g. symmetrical). Counted here are 
exchanges of patronage and benefaction, where the parties 
involved are not status equals and where what they exchange 
is not of equal value (let alone equivalent kind). Asymmetrical 
exchanges, like symmetrical exchanges, can result in a 
powerful social dynamic, often resembling friendship, and 
equally often cast in the language of friendship, but as we 
shall see below, friendship is as much part of the domain of 
symmetrical exchange as is giftship. 
4.What follows is my adaption of the Stegemanns’s adaptation of Sahlins’s model. See 
Stegemann and Stegemann (1995:34–37).
Negative exchange
Negative exchanges are those in which one party attempts 
to get more and give up less: haggling and cheating. I am 
less inclined than I once was to include stealing here. Stealing 
is redistributive but it is not really a form of exchange. In 
haggling or cheating, both parties come away with something, 
even if one comes away with less than would be ideal.5
The quest for precision requires us to acknowledge that, in 
a Graeco-Roman context at least, the exchange of gifts and 
the exchange of benefits (acts of patronage and benefaction) 
fall into two different types of exchange. The former is 
symmetrical, the latter is not, and the two are, it must be 
stressed, mutually exclusive. When exchanges become 
asymmetrical, they cease to be gifting and likely become 
patronage or something related. In fact, to turn the analogy 
around, when a benefaction is repaid in full, it is no longer 
a benefaction, for repayment transforms the exchange from 
asymmetrical to symmetrical. Of course, this is something 
that was sharply inadvisable according to Pliny (Ep. 
10.51). A gift, therefore, within a Graeco-Roman context, is 
something exchanged between people with equal status and 
reciprocated with something of equal value. To illustrate: 
how does a freshly appointed governor repay the emperor 
for his patronage? Even a governor, elite though he is, lacks 
the status, power and resources to give the emperor anything 
he does not already have or have access to. How does a poet 
repay the one who supports his poetic endeavours financially 
and secures him an audience? If the poet could do the same 
for his patron (symmetrical exchange) he would not have 
needed a patron in the first place. 
To say that gift exchange and patronage – symmetrical 
and asymmetrical exchanges – are mutually exclusive is 
not to deny that they are easily confused, which explains 
past imprecision. In both cases, things are exchanged; 
gratitude, reciprocity, respect, honour, et cetera, are all 
expected responses; a long standing relationship results, 
as does goodwill. It is even possible for frank speech, 
Plutarch’s truest test of friendship, to appear in asymmetrical 
relationships. But gifting and patronage are not the same 
thing, nor are friendship and patronage. The reason why 
gifting and patronage are so easily confused in the Greek 
and Roman periods is because of their culturally peculiar 
practice of using friendship language to make asymmetrical 
relationships and exchanges appear symmetrical.
Receiving an act of patronage required one to broadcast one’s 
dependence upon a superior and, by extension, to broadcast 
one’s lower relative status. Because of this, both Greeks and 
Romans appropriated the language of friendship – fi/loj in 
Greek, amicitia in Latin – in order to mask relationships of 
dependence or inequality. One never finds patrons referring 
to fellow-elite clients as clients; they are always referred 
to as ‘friends’. There is a difference of opinion on how to 
interpret this. David Konstan (1995, 1997) has argued that the 
language of friendship is used because friendship describes 
5.See Crook (2006:91).
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the relationships in question. Konstan points out, correctly 
of course, that these people knew the difference between 
friendship and clientage, so we should trust them to so 
distinguish. Whilst I agree with Konstan that ancient people 
knew the difference between clients and friends, I find 
more compelling the direction of those who argue that the 
friendship language is a ‘coyness’ and ‘dressing up’ of status 
and exchange inequalities.6 Attention to status and exchange 
equality – in the form of culturally appropriate models of 
giftship and friendship – can contribute to this interesting 
debate.
Exchange and social status
All gifts obligate, but a gift from a social superior obligates in a 
way that inscribes the inequality and inferiority of the person 
with the lower status, whereas a gift exchanged between 
status equals – friends – obligates positively and inscribes 
their equality. The best way to illustrate the difference 
is to attend to the stigma many knew of relationships of 
dependence. Cicero claims that wealthy people were loath to 
be put under an obligation of any kind: ‘it is bitter as death 
to them to have accepted a patron or to be called clients’ (De. 
Off. 2.69). The people Cicero imagines in this position would 
have been elite. The plebs were surely accustomed to being 
called much worse and were, in any case, too reliant to be so 
concerned with perceptions. 
Seneca expresses something similar: ‘There are some who are 
not willing to receive a benefit unless it is privately bestowed’ 
(De ben. 2.23.1; LCL). Others accept, but try to give their 
thanks privately, quietly, and away from the crowds. Seneca 
charges these people with repudiation and ingratitude 
(2.23.2), an exceedingly serious social ill according to Seneca: 
‘Homicides, tyrants, thieves, adulterers, robbers, sacrilegious 
men, and traitors there always will be; but worse than all 
these is the crime of ingratitude’ (De ben. 1.10.4). In trying to 
avoid the odious reputation of being a client (clientium), they 
end up with a far worse reputation: that they are ingrates 
(2.23.3). On the stigma of receiving of benefits, Seneca (De 
brevitate vitae) laments – whilst discussing another topic – 
the condition of those who are engrossed in other people’s 
business, whose sleep and wake, the pace of their walk, and 
who they like and dislike are dictated by another (De brev. vit. 
19.3). Clients, in other words, are no better off than slaves.
Juvenal lampoons the treatment clients receive from their 
patrons. Wealthy patrons stack their parties with clients, 
both in order to placate them but also in order to make their 
parties seem well attended. But patrons then treat some 
clients with contempt. He relates open insults, indignities, 
and being forced to eat scraps fit only for dogs (Satire 5.8–
11) and drink wine that not even fresh-clipped wool would 
want to suck up (Satire 5.24–25). Even the water the patron 
6.See Smith (2003:145). See also Saller (1982:15) and Saller (1989). I think the 
difference between the two positions is easily explained: Konstan is interested in 
the experience of friendship – and he is quite right that feelings of friendship could 
be found in unequal relationships – whereas others (myself included) are interested 
not in the experience of friendship but in the institution, which has requirements, 
such as equality and freedom (parrhsi/a), that cannot be overcome by emotion. 
Not to mention the fact that experience, such as emotion, is a far more difficult 
measure of something than something like status and exchange asymmetry.
drinks is better (Satire 5.51–52). Juvenal, it must be admitted, 
is writing satire, not social history; nonetheless, satire and 
exaggeration are not funny if they are not grounded to some 
degree in reality.7
Paul Millett (1989) suggests that the reason one might 
wish not to become dependent on a social superior has to 
do with a concern over slavishness, a concern that goes 
back to Aristotle. The person of lower status in an unequal 
relationship ‘is forced to compromise his e0leuqeri/a by 
adapting his behaviour to gratify his potential benefactor, 
on whose favours he is dependent’ (Millett 1989:33). The 
stigma associated with relationships of dependence, and 
the reception of benefactions as opposed to the reception of 
gifts, is evident in another Graeco-Roman practice: the use 
of friendship language to mask relationships of dependence. 
All of this illustrates the status awareness of ancient people, 
particularly elites. It also illustrates the stigma associated 
with relationships of dependence that naturally lead to the 
usurpation of the language of friendship. Let us look at two 
examples of this, one Greek and the other Roman, and from 
different periods. I cannot be exhaustive here, of course, 
so my hope in choosing these two examples is that they 
will illustrate that we are dealing here with wide-spread 
cultural practices, not the idiosyncrasies of specific localities.
Xenophon
Writing in Athens in the 4th century BCE, Xenophon relates 
a conversation (Memorabilia 2.9) in which Socrates advises 
Criton on how to get out from under threats of blackmail: 
blackmail them back. Socrates asks, ‘Why not keep a man’ 
around to act as a dog guarding the sheep? When Criton 
worries that even this man would turn on him, Socrates 
assures him there are many men in the city would be 
honoured to be a fi/loj to Criton (2.9.3). Given the context, 
clearly Xenophon’s Socrates is not imagining someone of 
equal social station to Criton, so he cannot be suggesting the 
two will actually be close friends. He is suggesting using one 
of Criton’s clients to do some dirty work. Proving this point, 
Criton settles on Archedemus, an eloquent but poor man. 
Archedemus is so good at persuading people to drop their 
actions against Criton that soon Criton’s fi/loi, in this case 
social equals, want to employ Archedemus too (2.9.7).
Archedemus is not Criton’s social equal; he is a client. In 
return for Archedemus’s work, Criton gives him provisions 
from his crops, wine, wool and invites him to dinners. There 
is reciprocity, but not equality, and Socrates’s use of fi/loj 
earlier does not imply real friendship. Nor does Xenophon 
think so: he refers to Archedemus as Criton’s dog from which 
the other shepherds (Criton’s friends) want to benefit (2.9.7). 
It is the stereotypical patron–client relationship, so of course 
Archedemus is eventually mocked by his peers; they call him 
ko/lac (2.9.8), because he does not have the freedom to speak 
his mind. Archedemus responds lamely with the claim that 
7.This makes Duncan Cloud’s (1989) claim that Juvenal’s satirical presentation cannot 
be thought realistic in any way inexplicable.
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it is better to have honest men like Criton and his friends as 
fi/loi than to be dishonest yourself. Xenophon closes with the 
observation that Archedemus came to be counted amongst 
Criton’s fi/loi, but clearly the friendship is fictive, even 
allowing for Criton’s deep appreciation of Archedemus’s 
work.
Horace
A second example comes from the Augustan poet Horace, 
who warns Lollius away from seeking out a rich patron. 
Proper friendship requires the ability to speak freely 
(parrhsi/a), which derives exclusively from social equality. 
Horace’s advice to Lollius cannot be idiosyncratic: there is 
no freedom in unequal friendships. If one’s ‘friend’ wishes to 
go hunting, one does not get to spend the afternoon writing 
poetry (1.18.39–40); great care is needed in what one says, 
to whom and about whom it is said, because incriminating 
words always find a way of migrating back to one’s patron 
(1.18.67–69); and extreme caution needs to be exercised when 
one introduces someone new to a patron (1.18.76–85). Horace 
even warns Lollius away from seeking a relationship with a 
great friend altogether: ‘Those who have never tried think it 
pleasant to court a friend in power; one who has tried dreads 
it’ (1.18.86–87; LCL). This is not freedom and it is therefore 
not true friendship. Where status equality is absent, there 
cannot be true friendship for true friendship does not require 
extreme caution, which is surely the opposite of parrhsi/a. 
The ‘friendship’ is a fiction and Horace knows it full well, 
probably from personal experience.
Never once in this letter does Horace use the words patronus 
or cliens; he uses amicus exclusively and both to describe 
Lollius (1.18.4, 101) and the would-be patron (1.18.24, 44, 73, 
86). It comes as some surprise then when the Loeb translator 
(Fairclough 1991) uses ‘patron’ to translate a masculine 
demonstrative adjective (illius; at 1.18.37). Of course, the 
person referred to is a patron, but Horace would never call 
him that and the translation misses Horace’s own cultural 
sensitivity.
These two examples are illustrative. On the one hand, 
both show that the people in question distinguished quite 
attentively between kinds of friends and social status, but, 
on the other hand, they also show that vocabulary tells us 
nothing about these distinctions. The language of friendship 
abounds, but only attention to the combination of status 
difference and parrhsi/a tells us that Archedemus and Criton 
share a fictive-friendship, whilst Criton and the others who 
wished also to benefit from Archedemus’s skill were proper 
friends. Likewise, it is inconceivable that either Horace or 
Lollius were under any illusion that ‘friendship’ was really 
what Lollius was in search of. 
Anthropological work confirms that there is a spectrum 
from emotional friendship to instrumental friendship and 
onwards to patronage, depending upon affection and on the 
degree of imbalance: 
what may start out as a symmetrical reciprocal relationship 
between equal parties may ... develop into a relation in which 
one of the parties ... develops a position of strength, and the 
other a position of weakness. 
(Wolf 1966:13) 
Yet, friendship is fluid; it can cease to be become friendship 
when imbalance becomes conspicuous:
When instrumental friendship reaches a maximum point of 
imbalance so that one partner is clearly superior to the other in 
his capacity to grant goods and services, we approach the critical 
point where friendships give way to the patron-client tie. 
(Wolf 1966:16)8
Friendship and fictive-friendship: 
A model
A number of features of the ancient world need to be brought 
together in order to understand this model. These features 
are drawn from ancient sources and supplemented by 
anthropological ways of thinking about exchange. Firstly, it 
is worthwhile to note that ancient Mediterranean societies 
were profoundly aware of status, as can be seen from the two 
examples above, amongst others. Secondly, in a vertically 
structured society, everyone with honour was acutely aware 
of their position in the hierarchy: there were people with 
less honour, but there were also always people with more 
honour. If ancient sources are any indication, there seems 
to have been an understanding amongst elites not to draw 
undue attention to the relative status differences amongst 
them. Thirdly, the language of friendship was appropriated 
to mask unequal but elite relationships and thus to diminish 
the shame associated with relationships of dependence. 
Finally, exchanges of patronage and giftship are mutually 
exclusive forms of exchange, representing asymmetrical 
and symmetrical status exchanges respectively. Treating the 
terminology as interchangeable is therefore obfuscating, not 
enlightening. 
The model illustrates what the ancient sources reveal: that 
when the status of the parties (horizontal axis) is symmetrical 
and when the value of what is exchanged (the horizontal axis) 
is also symmetrical, we have friendship (and, incidentally, 
the exchange of gifts). Conversely, when the status of the 
parties are asymmetrical and when the value of what is 
exchanged is also asymmetrical, we have clientage (and, 
incidentally, patronage or benefaction). Fictive-friendship 
arises somewhere between those two poles. The benefit of 
the range implied in the model is that there is no hard line 
between friendship, fictive-friendship and clientage. Much 
depends on the specific circumstances. Nonetheless, fictive-
friendship refers to those relationships of dependence 
in which the language of friendship is used to mask a 
relationship of dependence and to diminish the attendant 
stigma (Figure 1).
8.Wolf’s (1966) observation is reflected also in Latin American ethnographic work. 
Lola Romanucci-Ross (1973) writes about a Mexican village in which society is 
vertically and hierarchically structured, much like the ancient Mediterranean 
world. She writes that ‘Friendship in the village is a horizontal relation – i.e., it 
exists among people are, roughly, peers on any given level. It does not (and, as 
far as we know, cannot) exist among people who are vertically much separated 
in status, because this would automatically produce a patronage relation’ 
(Romanucci-Ross 1973:74–75).
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Before we examine how the model illuminates selected 
passages from the Fourth Gospel, a few caveats concerning 
the term ‘fictive-friendship’ are in order. Most importantly, 
the term, a neologism as far as I can tell, is not meant 
pejoratively. It is meant in the same neutral manner as the 
term ‘fictive-kinship’. The language of kinship was used in 
many circles where the kinship was not technical. Also, the 
term fictive-friendship is not meant to deny the possibility 
that there may, in some cases, have been real feelings of 
affection between people of unequal status in relationships of 
dependence. The term focuses on status equality and not on 
the emotion or affection of the individuals involved. Besides, 
ancient writers are consistent on this point: if both parties do 
not have total freedom to speak their mind, which typically 
requires status equality, then the relationship we are seeing is 
not really friendship. Ultimately, then, it is not a question of 
whether two people had friendly feelings for each other (say, 
Horace and Maecenas), but whether they had parrhsi/a.
Fictive-friendship in John 15:12–17 
and 19:10–13
There are two places in the Fourth Gospel where the word 
fi/loj is used in a way that illustrates the challenge of 
understanding ancient uses of friendship language in light of 
status difference and obligation: John 15:12–17 and 19:10–13.
In John 15:14–17, Jesus has some surprising things to say 
about friendship, especially from an ancient Mediterranean 
perspective:
14You are my friends if you do what I command you. 15No longer 
do I call you servants, for the servant does not know what his 
master is doing; but I have called you friends, for all that I have 
heard from my Father I have made known to you. 16You did 
not choose me, but I chose you and appointed you that you 
should go and bear fruit and that your fruit should abide; so that 
whatever you ask the Father in my name, he may give it to you. 
17This I command you, to love one another.
(Jn 15:14–17)
There are so many reasons why it is hard to accept that 
friendship is really what Jesus – according to the author of 
the Fourth Gospel – has in mind. The first is not reflected in 
this passage but in the Fourth Gospel as a whole. The Fourth 
Gospel goes further than any other New Testament work 
in its high Christology, in its association of Jesus with God. 
Jesus therefore cannot have the same status as his disciples, 
or anyone for that matter, because he is, in the narrative 
framework of this gospel, essentially equal with God. In a 
Graeco-Roman context, then, Jesus is not their friend.
What he is to the disciples, however, is reflected in this 
passage: he is their broker.9 God is the patron and Jesus 
mediates (Jn 15:16). In the real world, the broker is not the 
patron, but he does have a higher status than the client 
and, by acting as a mediator between the patron and client, 
provides the client with a benefaction in and of itself (Batten 
2010; Neyrey 2005, 2007). The broker is a second patron to a 
client and thus this person can expect to be treated somewhat 
like a patron: he can expect gratitude, honour and, to some 
extent, loyalty. Thus in a second way, as broker, Jesus in this 
passage is does not have status equality with the disciples or 
any of his followers. 
That a lack of status equality between Jesus and his disciples 
is assumed in this passage is apparent in the two times 
that Jesus commands (e0nte/llw) the disciples. In no ancient 
definition of friendship does one find that a friend is one 
who does what he is commanded. Clearly, a lack of status 
equality must be present in order for one ‘friend’ to command 
another, which is certainly what we find in relationships of 
dependence and obligation, which also use the language of 
friendship, but do not describe actual friendship.
That Jesus, in view of John’s high Christology, has a 
substantially higher status than the disciples, that he is in 
this passage – and, according to Neyrey (2007), throughout 
the Fourth Gospel – cast in the role of broker, and that he 
commands his disciples suggests that the category of fictive-
friendship applies here. Jesus claims the disciples as friends, 
but clearly he is their superior and they are obligated to him. 
This would make the relationship one of fictive-friendship, 
not actual friendship.
The second interesting instance of friendship language comes 
from the trial narrative, which depicts Pilate as increasingly 
convinced that Jesus is no more than a madman and certainly 
not the threat ‘the Jews’ make him out to be. When Pilate 
9.One sees here a tension in the Fourth Gospel that results from the fact that early 
Christians are in the process of working towards a Trinitarian theology, but are not 
there yet: on the one hand, the Christology of the Fourth Gospel is far advanced 
of synoptic Christology, and yet by presenting Jesus as broker – and not patron, 
a move that Malina (1996:151) correctly points out does not occur in Christian 
theology until the 4th century CE – the implication is that Jesus and God are not 
quite yet interchangeable. 
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FIGURE 1: The relationship between friendship, fictive-friendship and clientage, 
in correlation to the value of the exchange and the status of the parties involved 
in it.
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announces his intent to release Jesus, ‘the Jews’ threaten him: 
‘If you release this man, you are no friend (fi/loj) of Caesar. 
Every man who makes himself a king opposes Caesar’ (Jn 
19:12). Both those making the threat and Pilate know full 
well that Pilate and Tiberius are not friends; they are not 
social equals. Tiberius is the Roman Emperor and lacks for 
nothing; if that were not enough to indicate that he and Pilate 
are not social equals, the fact that he appointed Pilate prefect 
over Judea makes it certain that he is Pilate’s patron, not 
his friend. Yet, Pilate is an elite and ‘the Jews’ must avoid 
antagonising him, because (according to the narrative of the 
Fourth Gospel) they need him to do what they legally cannot, 
namely dispatch Jesus. For ‘the Jews’ to have referred to 
Pilate as what he is – Tiberius’s client – would have shamed 
him. The language of friendship is used in order to hide the 
stigma of Pilate being an elite dependent. It is all illusion of 
course – the friendship between Pilate and Tiberius is fictive 
– but as with all social convention, it is no less effective for 
that. 
Conclusion
The language of friendship was multivalent in Graeco-
Roman antiquity. It is not that people in these cultures did not 
distinguish between friendship and other relationships (e.g. 
slavery, manumission, marriage and patronage). They most 
certain did and both cultures were highly aware of status 
differences. And yet, the language of friendship was used in 
many instances that did not pertain to actual friendship, at 
least in the purest sense. Friendship language was often used 
to place a veneer over relationships of dependence precisely 
because of the status consciousness of these cultures. To be a 
dependent was common, yet shameful. It was rare therefore 
to refer to client as clients (it was more common, because of 
the honour inherent in the title, to refer to patrons as patrons). 
Instead the language of friendship was used. I have argued 
in this paper for a new category that we might call fictive-
friendship: it is found most commonly (in a Roman setting) 
between fellow elites, but can be found in Greek settings that 
do not involve fellow elites, and in the Fourth Gospel. Fictive-
Friendship is to be understood like fictive-kinship: not to cast 
aspersions on a relationship (did two people actually like 
each other), but to note the redeployment of language from 
one institution (a friendship-like kinship) for use in a much 
more diffuse way and with a social function. 
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